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INTRODUCTION
With the rise of the internet in recent decades, it has become increasingly easy for
various enterprises—including retailers, advertising agencies, and service
providers—to acquire, use, and even share the personal details of their users. 1 Such
a trend is unlikely to decrease in the coming years; in fact, internet usage is only
likely to increase as more and more people gain access to the internet.2 In the wake

*. J.D. Candidate, 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Aaron Brown, The Amount of Data Facebook Collects from Your Photos
Will TERRIFY You, EXPRESS (Jan. 6, 2017, 12:12 PM), https://www.express.co.uk/life
-style/science-technology/751009/Facebook-Scan-Photos-Data-Collection [https://perma.cc
/NF5F-F5K9]; Todd Haselton, How To Find Out What Google Knows About You and Limit
the Data It Collects, CNBC (Nov. 20, 2017, 11:50 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/20
/what-does-google-know-about-me.html [https://perma.cc/K3SQ-STM2]; Kirsten Korosec,
This Is the Personal Data that Facebook Collects—and Sometimes Sells, FORTUNE (Mar. 21,
2018), http://fortune.com/2018/03/21/facebook-personal-data-cambridge-analytica/ [https://
perma.cc/KQG8-WH8J]; Matt Smith, How Much Does Google Really Know About You?,
MAKEUSEOF (June 17, 2014), https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/how-much-google-know
-about-you/ [https://perma.cc/X8F3-HJPD].
2. See generally CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFO. CTR., STATISTICAL REPORT ON
INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA (2017) (examining internet usage and access trends in the
United States, the European Union, and China, respectively); Internet Access and Use
Statistics - Households and Individuals, EUROSTAT (Jan. 30, 2017, 2:49 PM),
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:Internet_access
_and_use_statistics_-_households_and_individuals
[https://perma.cc/3BSZ-VCV4];
Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www
.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/ [https://perma.cc/GP3J-XZ9R].
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of recent data breaches, including the now infamous breach of Equifax 3 as well as
the scandal involving Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, 4 people are even more
aware of the need for (and the risk of not having) adequate data protection laws.
Luckily though, in the last few years there have been serious pushes across the globe
to institute new data protection laws5 that ensure private data is not used for nefarious
purposes or given away frivolously.
This Note intends to outline the current data protection regimes in three large
jurisdictions across the globe (the European Union, China, and the United States), to
offer insight into the strengths and weaknesses of each regime, and to predict the
path that data protection laws in the United States should take in upcoming years. As
will be seen, both the European Union and China, with the institution of their newest
data protection laws, use omnibus regimes, in contrast with the United States’ current
sector specific regime.6 The United States should move from its current regime, in
which there are only national laws for specific industries, 7 to a more omnibus regime,
taking elements from both the European and the Chinese data protection regimes,
which will help provide a minimum floor of protection applicable to all citizens
whose personal data is being processed rather than allowing for varying levels of
protection between states and industries.
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR DATA PROTECTION LAWS
Before being able to properly analyze the data protection laws of the jurisdictions
mentioned above, it is important to first create a framework against which to analyze
those regimes. For this purpose, this Note will adapt a five-element framework put
forth by Professor Fred H. Cate.8 Instead of using those five elements, which are

3. See AnnaMaria Andriotis, Michael Rapoport & Robert McMillan, ‘We’ve Been
Breached’: Inside the Equifax Hack, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2017, 8:04 AM), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/weve-been-breached-inside-the-equifax-hack-1505693318 [https://perma
.cc/5THE-4R22]; Ron Lieber, How To Protect Yourself After the Equifax Breach, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/your-money/equifax-data-breach
-credit.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4638-EPHR].
4. See generally Nellie Bowles, After Cambridge Analytica, Privacy Experts Get to Say
‘I Told You So,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12
/technology/privacy-researchers-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/CE2V-SSU5]; Nicholas
Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout So Far, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica
-scandal-fallout.html [https://perma.cc/VE7R-3S76].
5. Such a push may not actually be a very new idea, but recent legislation certainly points
to an increased push for data protection guaranteed by national (and sometimes international)
law. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 51 [hereinafter
Treaty of Lisbon] (declaring in Article 16 B that “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of
personal data concerning them”).
6. See ORLA LYNSKEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW 15–30 (2015).
7. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012 & Supp. II 2015); Children’s Internet Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, tit. XVII, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-335 to -352 (2000); Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
8. Fred H. Cate, Big Data, Consent, and the Future of Data Protection, in BIG DATA IS
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intended for use in the management of big data,9 this Note will use a modified threefactor framework intended to apply to all instances of data processing and collection,
not just those which can be classified as big data. The three elements of this
framework consist of: (1) data stewardship, (2) a balance between harms and
benefits, and (3) a system of transparency and redress. Individually, each element
covers a different aspect of data processing. Data stewardship involves the proper
collection and storage of personal data.10 The balance between harms and benefits
covers what a data processor can (and should) do once they have received personal
data.11 Finally, having a system of transparency and redress ensures that data subjects
themselves can properly monitor their own data and have ways of ensuring that data
processors are not violating anyone’s rights and causing harm. 12
A. Data Stewardship
Individual consent to the use of personal data by various websites and companies
has, for a long time, been standard practice.13 Consent to a website’s “privacy policy”
is often done automatically, with consumers assuming that a website will, naturally,
“follow[] fair information practice principles.”14 Yet in reality, such consent is rarely
truly informed or adequate,15 usually for two reasons. First is the existence of a

NOT A MONOLITH 3 (Cassidy R. Sugimoto, Hamid R. Ekbia & Michael Mattioli eds., 2016).
Professor Cate’s frameworkes specifically on the management of Big Data, with the
framework consisting of: (1) a focus on data stewardship, id. at 12; (2) a system of risk
management, id.; (3) an increased focus on data uses, id. at 14; (4) a framework of harms, id.
at 16; and (5) transparency and redress, id. at 17.
9. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) defines big data as “a confluence of factors,”
including the collection of data from various sources, the plethora of available data storage
mediums for low costs, and the presence of immense computing power to analyze that data
and draw conclusions from it. EDITH RAMIREZ, JULIE BRILL, MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN &
TERRELL MCSWEENY, FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR
EXCLUSION? 1 (2016). Three characteristics (called the “three Vs”) used to identify big data
are volume (the sheer amount of data being analyzed), velocity (the speed at which a company
can collect and analyze the data), and variety (referring to the variety, or “breadth,” of data
being collected). Id. at 1–2.
10. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Privacy, the Hacker Way, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 47–49
(2013).
11. See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1890–92 (2013) (discussing how the harms and benefits
of giving up personal data can change depending on the time, place, reason, etc. surrounding
the use).
12. See Richard J. Peltz-Steele, The New American Privacy, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 365, 375
(2013).
13. See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 43–46 (2015) (discussing
the “notice and choice” standard that has existed in the United States since the 1970s).
14. Patrick F. Gallagher, The Internet Website Privacy Policy: A Complete Misnomer?,
35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 373, 380 (2001); see also WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN
A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING
INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 15 (2012).
15. See Thomas B. Norton, Note, The Non-Contractual Nature of Privacy Policies and a
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“knowledge gap” between the consumer and the data processor. 16 The average
consumer rarely knows, or even considers, the uses to which their personal data will
be put,17 whether it be due to the complexity of the terms, ignorance of the existence
of the privacy policies, or simply an inability to process these lengthy notices. 18 The
second failing of individual consent, as explained by Professor Paul Schwartz, is the
so-called “consent fallacy,”19 where individuals may not truly have a choice in
whether or not to consent because they are seeking to use a necessary service or they
fear reprisals of some sort.20
So rather than allowing companies to rely on the consent of individual data
subjects, data protection laws should seek to require proper data stewardship by
companies, allowing the data subjects to rely on companies to use personal data
responsibly.21 Thus the law should incentivize companies to look for and protect
personal data from foreseeable harms so that individuals can feel safer in allowing
personal data onto the internet or to be collected by various companies.22 The exact
structure of such incentives has not been codified, but several commenters have laid
out potential solutions. For example, Professor Andrea Matwyshyn has laid out a
data stewardship model that has been informed by and built from contract and trade
law.23 That model incorporates personal data use as part of a contract between the

New Critique of the Notice and Choice Privacy Protection Model, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 181, 201 (2016); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First
Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85,
140–48 (2014). But see Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig. v. Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 19–21
(1st Cir. 2003) (suggesting that even cursory consent to an online privacy agreement is
adequate in many, but not all, circumstances).
16. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1683–84 (1999).
17. Id.; see also Amanda Grannis, You Didn’t Even Notice! Elements of Effective Online
Privacy Policies, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1109, 1147–48 (2015); Andrew J. McClurg, A
Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling,
98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 133–37 (2003).
18. See Cate, supra note 8, at 6–8; Peppet, supra note 15, at 144–46 (discussing the
weaknesses of privacy policies related to use of objects connected to the “Internet of Things”);
Reidenberg et al., supra note 13, at 47–48; Solove, supra note 11, at 1884.
19. Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1684; see also George Ashenmacher, Indignity:
Redefining the Harm Caused by Data Breaches, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2016).
20. Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1684; see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party,
Opinion 2/2017 on Data Processing at Work, 17/EN WP 249 (June 8, 2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=45631 [https://perma.cc/95GQ-NZS3]
[hereinafter DPWP] (recognizing that forcing employees to consent to broad uses of their
personal data is not really voluntary consent).
21. See Cate, supra note 8, at 12; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA:
SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 55–56 (2014) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE BIG
DATA REPORT].
22. Cate, supra note 8; see also Ashenmacher, supra note 19, 44–55 (discussing why it is
so important to identify harms caused by breaches of personal data).
23. Matwyshyn, supra note 10. Professor Matwyshyn is not the only one who has
identified parallels between data protection and contract law. See, e.g., Tanith L. Balaban,
Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation: Why Now Is the Time, 1 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH.
& INTERNET 1, 22–23 (2009) (discussing why contract law is related to but falls short of
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company and the consumers, which in turn would create “a new statutorily implied
warranty of ‘digital usability and quiet enjoyment.’”24
Another alternative, offered by Professor Jeff Kosseff, is the creation of various
tax incentives for companies to properly invest in and maintain cybersecurity
infrastructure.25 In this case, rather than retroactively punishing companies for not
properly protecting personal data, companies are proactively encouraged to establish
adequate security measures with the knowledge that they can receive certain tax
breaks or other benefits in return.26
In addition to incentivizing data processors to properly protect data, data
protection laws should also provide guidance towards the proper use of personal data.
The use of data in different contexts can often result in different levels of risk. 27 By
providing some guidance as to how personal data should be used, 28 data protection
laws can further push responsibility of data protection to the companies that collected
the data rather than to the consumer whose data is being collected.29 But it is
important to note that just because the focus is shifted to use of collected data does
not mean that there should be no regulations or responsibilities associated with data
collection. Instead, businesses using personal data should focus on the risks or
benefits associated with a particular use and should not just rely on the terms of
collection of that data.30 This element would help to eliminate the need for lengthy
privacy policy notices and prevent businesses from simply putting consumers on
notice of a broad, boilerplate list of possible uses of their data that a user must accept
in order to use the product or service offered. 31

providing for proper data protection); Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs.
Democracy: The Case of the European Information Privacy Network, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L.
807, 855–57 (2005); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right To Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1049, 1057–63 (2000). But see Norton, supra note 15.
24. Matwyshyn, supra note 10, at 48.
25. Jeff Kosseff, Positive Cybersecurity Law: Creating a Consistent and Incentive-Based
System, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 401, 415–16 (2016).
26. Id.
27. See Cate, supra note 8, at 15 (discussing the use of personal data in the context of big
data); WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 21, at 49–51.
28. A complete enumeration of allowable uses would be almost impossible due to both
the varying nature of personal data itself as well as the needs of various industries that would
be using the personal data. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN
ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 7–9 (2014).
29. With these two elements in place, legal focus will not even start in earnest until the
companies have collected the data (since they will be required to properly protect that data)
and begin to use that data (as a result of the greater focus on uses rather than collection of
data).
30. Cate, supra note 8, at 15.
31. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1685 (describing user acceptance of privacy
statements as a “hollow ritual” of consent to access various content).
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B. A Balance Between Harms and Benefits
Before a company can properly minimize the risk of harms from improper
treatment of data (and before a consumer can properly consent to giving their
information in light of those risks), the company must understand and identify those
potential harms.32 Commentators have identified various potential harms, but there
has been little concerted effort to enumerate the harms resulting from the misuse of
personal data.33 While it is important to include a broad spectrum of possible harms, 34
including both tangible and intangible injuries, the real benefit of codifying specific
harms is that it gives notice to consumers, who now understand what harms could
result from giving up their personal data, and businesses, who must analyze those
harms to determine how much risk they pose and determine if they wish to pursue
the data processing.35
While it is important for data protection laws to enumerate broad potential harms
and to recognize that “the range of privacy-related harms is more expansive than
economic or physical harm or unwarranted intrusions,” 36 it is also important for
governments not to be overbroad in their classification of potential harms. 37 Laws
that are too broad risk alienating both potential businesses (who will be unwilling to
bear the burden of those potential harms)38 and potential consumers (who are
unwilling to submit their information to the risk of those potential harms). So, any

32. Cate, supra note 8, at 16.
33. See, e.g., LYNSKEY, supra note 6, at 77 (recognizing a tangible harm (discrimination)
and an intangible harm (the feeling of helplessness) that can result from misuse of personal
data); Gallagher, supra note 14, at 385 (citing reputation harm as one potential harm of misuse
of personal data); Scott J. Shackelford, Anjanette Raymond, Danuvasin Charoen, Rakshana
Balakrishnan, Prakhar Dixit, Julianna Gjonaj & Rachith Kavi, When Toasters Attack: A
Polycentric Approach to Enhancing the “Security of Things,” 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 440–
41 (2017) (referencing a “myriad of ways” consumers can be harmed, including bad credit
ratings); see also MARIA TZANOU, THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION 21–24
(2017) (implicating the right of privacy as under threat from an abuse of personal data).
34. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 10–11 (2008) (creating sixteen
categories of processing activities that can result in harm to individuals).
35. Cate, supra note 8, at 17; see, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, supra note 14, at 19–21; PeltzSteele, supra note 12, at 408; Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1645–47.
36. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28, at 8; see also WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT,
supra note 21, at 51–53 (acknowledging that harms can range from tangible to intangible as
well as affect both individuals and groups).
37. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle, in PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR
INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE; A REPORT TO CONGRESS 57
(2000) (criticizing the FTC’s recommendation for “breathtakingly broad” legislation directed
towards consumer-oriented websites).
38. See, e.g., Manu J. Sebastian, The European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation: How Will It Affect Non-EU Enterprises?, 31 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 216,
235 (2015) (explaining one potential risk of overbroad data privacy laws: forcing enterprises
to store all data pertaining to a certain subject or risk being unable to combat any legal action
taken against them).
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data privacy regime must carefully consider what effects, both social and economic,
inclusion of particular harms would cause. 39
But identifying only the potential harms of various processing activities leaves
out another vital part of personal data processing—the benefits to be achieved by that
processing.40 As discussed earlier, vital to any proper data protection regime is the
ability to contemplate and identify as many risks of a particular activity as possible,
with the goal of reducing those risks and increasing “predictability, consistency, and
efficiency in data protection.”41 But beyond just identifying the risks encompassed
by a particular activity, data protection laws (and data processors in general) must be
able to balance those risks against the benefits the activity may produce. For certain
activities, the benefits of data processing can sometimes outweigh the risks posed by
that processing.42
By creating a system that includes both risks and benefits in any overarching laws
regarding data protection, governments will preempt varying interpretations by
various companies and allow for consumers to properly set their expectations. 43
Naturally, any system of risk management will become a balancing act between the
benefits and risks of any particular activity, which could lead to seemingly arbitrary
distinctions between activity that is deemed beneficial enough to proceed as opposed
to activity that is too risky to proceed.44 However, by using a national law to inform
companies and consumers about what risks are acceptable (and to what degree)
nations will, at the very least, allow companies to properly tailor their behavior to
fall within the confines of the law and allow consumers to have confidence that they
know the uses to which their data will be put.45 Additionally, such an approach allows

39. See CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, THE ROLE OF RISK MANAGEMENT IN DATA
PROTECTION 25 (2014) (quoting Jennifer Stoddart, Auditing Privacy Impact Assessments: The
Canadian Experience, in PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 430 (David Wright & Paul De Hert
eds., 2012)) (discussing the use of social and economic analyses to develop programs and
services to maximize the integration of risk management practices); DPWP, supra note 20, at
9–10 (discussing the balance between increased employee efficiency, protection of company
assets, and collection of personal data); SIMON HEAD, THE RUTHLESS ECONOMY: WORK AND
POWER IN THE DIGITAL AGE 100 (2005) (describing the “hyperefficiency” caused by “analysis,
surveillance[,] and control”); see also LYNSKEY, supra note 6, at 79–81 (discussing economic
factors and social factors as driving forces behind data protection regulation).
40. See, e.g., HEAD, supra note 39, at 100; LYNSKEY, supra note 6, at 80.
41. See Cate, supra note 8, at 12–13; cf. CYNTHIA R. FARINA, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO &
THOMAS M. SUSMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: TRANSPARENCY AND
DATA PROTECTION 139–41 (George A. Berman, Charles H. Koch, Jr. & James T. O’Reilly
eds., 2008).
42. See McClurg, supra note 17, at 72–74 (discussing the “important benefits “on both
individuals and society” that data collection and use can confer).
43. See CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, supra note 39, at 13.
44. Cf. K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make
Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 11 n.28 (2003) (discussing “arbitrary
distinctions” with permissible data uses based on whom the data relates or where the data was
collected).
45. See CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, A RISK-BASED APPROACH TO PRIVACY:
IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS IN PRACTICE 8–9 (2014) (suggesting a balance between likelihood
of harm and severity of harm, which takes into account the risk aversion of various different
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for governments to consolidate and resolve the “largely ad hoc, colloquial terms”
that have developed around data protection to this day. 46 By establishing a proper
system to balance the harms against the benefits of processing and allowing
enterprises to perform even risky processing if it results in enough of a benefit,
governments will be able to strike a balance between the protection of personal data
and the well-being of society as a whole.47
C. Transparency and Redress
Despite the existence of various laws to incentivize proper data protection, it is
almost inevitable that mistakes and data breaches will happen. 48 Therefore, data
protection laws must have in place requirements not only for consumers to see what
a business is doing with the personal data (transparency) 49 but also ways to
effectively respond and correct them (redress). 50
Transparency should allow for consumers not only to see what businesses are
using their personal data for, but also give consumers the chance to correct any
incorrect personal data.51 In this way, consumers can retain confidence and trust that
their personal data is not only being used appropriately but also that the data they
have given is as accurate as possible.52 While transparent behavior by businesses

kinds of businesses).
46. Cate, supra note 8, at 13; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28, at 38–39
(explaining that while a risk management standard should be “flexible,” it must also provide
businesses with “more concrete guidance”).
47. See Ryan Moshell, . . . And Then There Was One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory
United States Amidst a Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 357, 375–76 (2005) (showing how the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552
(2000), balances between the public’s right of access and a data subject’s right of privacy);
Peltz-Steele, supra note 12, at 379–83 (briefly discussing the safeguards contained in European
legislation designed to preserve freedom of expression); Scott J. Shackelford, Fragile
Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Privacy Rights for Public Figures, 49 AM. BUS.
L.J. 125, 131 (2012) (comparing the balance between freedom of expression and personal
privacy in several jurisdictions around the world).
48. Cate, supra note 8, at 18.
49. See Alan Toy, Different Planets or Parallel Universes: Old and New Paradigms for
Information Privacy, 25 N.Z.U. L. Rev. 938, 948 (2013) (defining transparency as the ability
of consumers to see what a business does with disclosed personal data); see also FARINA, supra
note 41, at 1–9 (discussing transparency as a citizen’s ability both to gain access to information
about “structure and function” of the government as well as access to documents “produced
and accumulated” by the government).
50. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 11 (1998)
[hereinafter FTC REPORT 1998] (suggesting that redress remedies should include both “right
of the wrong” and “compensation for any harm suffered”).
51. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012 & Supp. II 2015) (expressly allowing
individuals the right to access and correct personal data in the context of data gathering by the
U.S. government); Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 33 (EC) [hereinafter The
1995 Directive] (allowing individuals to request corrections and object to processing of
personal data).
52. Such accuracy is especially important where information is being used for national
security or criminal investigation purposes, since inaccurate information might not only open
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allows for consumers to pick and choose which businesses to frequent, 53
transparency in and of itself is not enough to ensure proper regulation. 54 Regulation
also needs a means of redress to be effective.55
With regard to redress, one of the first responses by any business is often sending
notification to consumers that a breach of personal data has occurred.56 In fact, such
a requirement is already in effect in many places.57 But just notifying consumers that
a breach has occurred does little to help them—it essentially shifts the burden of
caring for personal data back to the consumers and away from the businesses, which
is counter to the data stewardship element discussed earlier. 58 A proper data
protection regime must outline and address specific remedies available.59 In this way,

up an individual to reprisals or investigation by government authorities but might also waste
government resources tracking and investigating individuals who pose no threat (or even risk)
to national security. See NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, EFFICIENCY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
2015–16, HC 852, at 19 (UK) (discussing the cost of investigations and hearings which end up
being dropped); TRANSUNION, IMPROVING INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES AND SAVING TIME
USING ONLINE RESOURCES (2015) (discussing the importance of accurate information in any
investigation); see also Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal
Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541, 543 (2016) (discussing the tendency for groups to
assume that any information stored within a database is accurate).
53. Users will be able to make informed decisions using information about the uses to
which their personal data will be put, which helps to decrease the knowledge gap between
consumers and businesses. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1683–84.
54. See Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems: Multilevel Governance Involving a Diversity
of Organizations, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS: ANALYTICAL AND POLITICAL
CHALLENGES IN BUILDING GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 105, 120 (Eric Brousseau, Tom
Dedeurwaerdere, Pierre-André Jouvet & Marc Willinger eds., 2012) (discussing the
shortcomings of allowing consumer “trust” to regulate certain resource regimes and suggesting
that at least some monitoring, ex ante, is required to keep rule-breaking to a minimum).
55. FTC REPORT 1998, supra note 50, at 10 (stating that redress is a requirement for
privacy protection regulations to be effective).
56. See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches,
105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 915 (2007); Alan Wehbé, OPM Data Breach Case Study: Mitigating
Personnel Cybersecurity Risk, 26 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 75, 92 (2017). But see Editorial, Have
You Been Stolen?, WASH. POST (June 30, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
-dyn/content/article/2005/06/29/AR2005062902576.html [https://perma.cc/THB2-WWEL]
(criticizing the overabundance of breach notifications).
57. Shackelford et al., supra note 33, at 449 (“As of 2016, forty-seven states had databreach-notification laws.”); Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE ST.
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 29, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and
-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx
[https://perma.cc/SG4F
-Z38V] (explaining that as of 2018, all fifty states had data-breach-notification laws); The
1995 Directive, supra note 51, arts. 18–19 (obligating Member States to notify the supervisory
authority, but not the consumers whose personal data was breached).
58. See supra Section I.A.
59. Cf. Steven M. LoCascio, Forcing Europe To Wear the Rose-Colored Google Glass:
The “Right to be Forgotten” and the Struggle to Manage Compliance Post Google Spain, 54
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 296 (2015) (suggesting an administrative and legal framework for
enforcing a “Right to Be Forgotten” online, by analyzing privacy laws and enforcement in
Europe and the United States).
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enterprises are incentivized not only to protect personal data before a breach, but also
to correct any breaches that occur and ensure that such breaches do not occur in the
future.60
II. JURISDICTIONAL APPLICATION
This Part will analyze the data protection regimes of each jurisdiction 61 and
compare them with the framework developed above. The order of analysis has been
chosen based upon how long each jurisdiction has been developing its regional data
protection laws. Therefore, the European Union, which is on its second iteration of a
regional data protection law, has been analyzed first; China, which has recently
developed and implemented its first national data protection law, will be analyzed
second; and the United States, which does not yet have a national data protection law
will be analyzed last, with the added benefit of being able to compare proposed or
anticipated national U.S. laws to the previous two jurisdictions.
Each Section will also provide a brief background of data protection in each
jurisdiction, which will provide brief but useful background material for determining
how or why the regulations in each jurisdiction have been developed into what they
are today.
A. The European Union
Unlike China and the United States, the European Union is currently undergoing
its second iteration of a regional set of laws governing data protection—the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).62 Thus, the European Union has a chance to
learn from application of its first iteration,63 as well as various cases that have further
developed the concepts of both data protection and privacy. 64
While now the right to data protection is considered a fundamental right within
the European Union,65 there was significant debate leading up to that designation. 66

60. Such ex post analysis of the causes of a breach are vital to ensuring that the same
breach does not occur in the future. See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 56, at 934–35.
61. The European Union, China, and the United States.
62. The General Data Protection Regulation came into force on May 25, 2018, two years
after it was passed by the European Parliament. Regulation (EU) 2016/679, On the Protection
of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and On the Free Movement
of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016
O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
63. The 1995 Directive, supra note 51.
64. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister for
Commc’ns, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 (GC Apr. 8, 2014); Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot.
Comm’r, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (GC Oct. 6, 2015); Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v.
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (GC May 13, 2014). For a
more in-depth analysis of the case law behind European data protection laws than will be
covered here, see MARIA TZANOU, THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION (2017).
65. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
16, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]; Charter of Fundamental Human
Right of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter CFHR].
66. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01, & C-139/01Österrichischer Rundfunk
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The need for data protection has been a concern of the European Parliament since at
least 1975, when data processing was still in its infancy. 67 The European Parliament
saw the need for data protection as so important that it passed its first regional data
protection law—the 1995 Directive68—at a time when only 1% of EU citizens were
using the internet.69
This first major iteration of data protection law in the European Union gives broad
principles within which Member States “shall . . . determine more precisely the
conditions under which the processing of personal data is lawful.”70 The 1995
Directive is classified as an “omnibus regime,” meaning that is intended to be
generally applicable to all sectors, with specific exceptions spelled out in its
provision.71 As such, it does not lay down any specific framework but provides
certain criteria within which national laws must fall. 72
Since the establishment of the 1995 Directive, the European Court of Justice has,
in three important cases, recognized the right to data protection as a fundamental
right, a backdrop against which the most recent data protection regime (the GDPR)73
has been developed. In a major step, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Digital
Rights Ireland Ltd., recognized the right to data protection as separate from the right
to privacy and discussed the need for “fair information principles” in the processing
of any personal data.74 In Google Spain, the ECJ sought the “fair balance” between
two rights: the fundamental right of data protection and the legitimate interest of
internet users to access certain information.75 Although they recognized that data
protection rights will “as a general rule” override the public interest in those cases,
they did also recognize that under certain circumstances (e.g. where the data subject
is a public official or exercises public authority) the public interest can outweigh the
data subject’s right to data protection. 76
The Schrems case77 showed a slight change from the court’s previous
jurisprudence. Although it acknowledges the existence of a right to data protection,

and Others, 2003 E.C.R. I-5014, ¶ 68 (declaring that the provisions of the 1995 Directive must
be interpreted “in light of fundamental rights,” suggesting that data protection itself might not
be among those fundamental rights). But see The 1995 Directive, supra note 51, pmbl. ¶ 10
(claiming that the object of laws regarding the processing of personal data is to “protect
fundamental rights and freedoms”).
67. See Resolution on the Protection of the Rights of the Individual in the Face of
Developing Technical Progress in the Field of Automatic Data Processing, 1975 O.J. (C 60) 48.
68. The 1995 Directive, supra note 51.
69. LYNSKEY, supra note 6, at 4.
70. Id. at 39.
71. See LYNSKEY, supra note 6, at 15–30. This is in contrast to the sectorial regime present
in the United States, which will be discussed later.
72. As will be seen later, this approach is very similar to the current approach in the United
States. See infra Section II.C.
73. GDPR, supra note 62.
74. Joined Cases C‑ 293/12 & C‑ 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister for
Commc’ns (2014), ¶¶ 39, 40.
75. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (2014),
¶ 81.
76. Id.
77. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. I-627.
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as enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the
European Union (CFHR),78 that right is viewed and analyzed as an extension of the
right to privacy enshrined in Article 7 of the CFHR. 79 Importantly, the court in
Schrems allowed for the invalidation of secondary legislation 80 that violated the
rights of data protection and privacy declared in the CFHR, 81 showing that EU courts
are willing to enforce recognized fundamental rights rather than allowing the
legislature to encroach on those rights.
As can be seen above, the European Union’s data protection regimes have arisen
in the past as a necessary extension of the fundamental rights of privacy and data
protection. In the face of such developments, though, the 1995 Directive has been
shown to be deficient. First, as a directive, many of the details were left up to EU
Member States, resulting in a variety of different laws among Member States.82 In
addition, Member States, individually responsible for enforcement of their laws, took
various approaches. Some focused on more proactive approaches, while others
remained more reactive in their enforcement. 83 As a result of such fragmentation
among Member States, the European Parliament, in April 2016, enacted the General
Data Protection Regulation, which finally took effect on May 25, 2018,84 in order to
“ensure a consistent and high level of protection of natural persons.”85
1. The General Data Protection Regulation
Building off the assumption that data protection (and privacy) is a fundamental
right to which all persons are entitled and with an intent not to unduly inhibit crossborder transfers of information, the European Parliament set out to develop a

78. CFHR, supra note 65, art. 8.
79. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. I-627, ¶¶ 177, 179. But
see PAUL DE HERT & SERGE GUTWIRTH, Privacy, Data Protection & Law Enforcement.
Opacity of the Individual and Transparency of Power, in PRIVACY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 61,
80 (Erik Claes, Antony Duff & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2006) (suggesting that European Courts
have been using a broad interpretation of the right of privacy to expand, rather than define, a
right of data protection).
80. Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the
Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US
Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7.
81. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. I-627, ¶ 237.
82. See FARINA, supra note 41, at 146–48; see generally Bignami, supra note 23
(providing an overview of the different data protection regimes among European States).
83. See FARINA, supra note 41, at 146–48.
84. To significant fanfare in the international community. See, e.g., Sam Schechner,
GDPR Takes Effect on Friday–Here’s What to Expect, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2018, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/5-questions-about-what-to-expect-when-gdpr-takes-effect
-1527154200 [https://perma.cc/Q2RP-T3ZS]; Alex Hern & Jim Waterson, Sites Block Users,
Shut Down Activities and Flood Inboxes as GDPR Rules Loom, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2018,
12:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/24/sites-block-eu-users
-before-gdpr-takes-effect [https://perma.cc/F3B6-XDZE].
85. GDPR, supra note 62, pmbl. ¶¶ 9, 10.
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universal, baseline set of data protection laws starting in 2012.86 Eventually, this
resulted in the current GDPR, which has been in effect since May 25, 2018. 87 In
broad reaching and never before seen levels of protection, the GDPR protects names,
addresses, racial data, cultural data, IP addresses, health data, and a plethora of other
personal information,88 not just within EU Member States, but across the globe.89
Although not vastly different from the 1995 Directive, the GDPR does seek to
reconcile the varying Member States’ interpretations of the 1995 Directive to allow
for proper function and cooperation under the Treaty of Lisbon. 90
With respect to the data stewardship element of the data protection framework,
the GDPR balances the need for data subject consent with a focus on the actual uses
to which personal data is being put. Although the GDPR lists consent as one possible
means for permissible data processing, 91 other permissible purposes for processing
include: other legal obligations, the public interest, and protection of a natural
persons’ vital interests.92 In addition, certain categories of personal data93 receive
heightened forms of protection, requiring specific measures—explicit consent,
substantial public interest, and protection of vital rights of a natural person who
cannot legally give consent—to be met before such data can be processed.94
Additionally, the GDPR sets forth the conditions for valid consent to processing,
stating that consent must be a “freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous
indication of the data subject’s agreement,” 95 unlike the 1995 Directive which
allowed for implied consent through silence or inactivity. 96 Such measures are
important for closing the “knowledge gap” inherent between a data subject and a data
processor,97 but ultimately, they do not do enough to shift reliance away from a data
subject’s consent to truly fulfill the spirit of the data stewardship element. 98
However, it is important to remember that the GDPR is meant to set a baseline
level of data protection, with individual Member States required to implement their

86. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 1, 6, COM (2012) 11 final
(Jan. 25, 2012).
87. GDPR, supra note 62 art. 94.
88. Sebastian, supra note 38, at 217.
89. See Peltz-Steele, supra note 12.
90. Edward R. Alo, EU Privacy Protection: A Step Towards Global Privacy, 22 MICH.
ST. INT’L L. REV. 1095, 1117 (2014).
91. See Peltz-Steele, supra note 12, at 374; GDPR, supra note 62, art. 6.
92. GDPR, supra note 62, art. 6.
93. Id. art. 9, ¶ 1.
94. Id. ¶ 2.
95. Id. pmbl. ¶ 32. This paragraph also expressly prohibits silence or inactivity as a valid
form of consent. Id.
96. The 1995 Directive only defines consent as “any freely given specific and informed
indication” of acceptance, allowing for silence or inactivity to be considered valid consent.
The 1995 Directive, supra note 51, art. 2.
97. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1660.
98. For example, Article 6 of the GDPR allows for processing beyond the scope of a data
subject’s consent if “any link” can be established between the purpose for collection and the
purpose of further processing. GDPR, supra note 62, art. 6.
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own laws in accordance with the GDPR.99 Looking at the laws passed by such
Member States, it is clear that, while the GDPR itself may not shift focus on data
stewardship, some Member States have expanded data protections to properly
encompass a data stewardship element. For example, France, soon after the passing
of the GDPR, enacted its new Law for a Digital Republic, 100 which expressly allows
for data subjects to decide and control the ways their personal data is used.101
However, such expansions are not universal. Germany, for example, has also
instituted a new data protection law, the Federal Data Protection Act, 102 but it does
not contain any specific provisions regarding a data subject’s ability to control or
decide upon uses of their personal data.
Although the GDPR does not, on its own, fulfill the data stewardship element of
the data protection framework, it does create a system by which enterprises can
balance the risks and the benefits of data processing. Rather than just referring
broadly to vague risks that could be caused by data processing, it gives specific
examples of harms, including identity theft, financial loss, reputational damage, or a
violation of any other fundamental right. 103 Potential benefits of data processing are
not enumerated in the same way, but implicit in many of its provisions are benefits
that can justify data processing, particularly national security, 104 vital interests of
another natural person,105 and protection of other fundamental rights. 106
The GDPR does not create a direct comparison between the benefits and harms
of data processing. Instead, security measures required to be implemented by
enterprises must be reflective of the risk of harm (and degree of those harms),107
which thus allows enterprises to create security measures that balance both their own

99. Id. pmbl. ¶ 167.
100. Loi 2016-1321 du 7 octobre 2016 pour une République numérique [Law 2016-1321
of October 7, 2016 for a Digital Republic], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RËPUBLIC FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 8, 2016, p. 0235 [hereinafter Law for a Digital
Republic]; see also Denise Lebeau-Marianna & Caroline Chancé, France: New Data
Protection Law Has Been Adopted, DLA PIPER: PRIVACY MATTERS (May 16, 2018),
https://blogs.dlapiper.com/privacymatters/france-new-data-protection-law-has-been-adopted/
[https://perma.cc/M35G-MZ2G].
101. Law for a Digital Republic art. 54; see also Olivier Proust & Gaëtan Goossens, France
Adopts
Digital
Republic
Law,
FIELDFISHER
(Oct.
4,
2016,
10:59),
http://privacylawblog.fieldfisher.com/2016/france-adopts-digital-republic-law/
[https://perma.cc/3LBG-MC9Y].
102. Gesetz zur Anpassung des Datenschutzrechts an die Verordnung (EU) 2016/679 und
zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie (EU) 2016/680 [DSAnpUG-EU] [Act to Adapt Data Protection
Law to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and to Implement Directive (EU) 2016/680], June 30, 2017,
BGBL I at 2097 (Ger.) [hereinafter German Data Protection Act].
103. GDPR, supra note 62, pmbl. ¶ 75.
104. Id. art. 23.
105. Id. art. 6.
106. Id. art. 23. This provision seems to suggest that the right to data protection is not as
important as other rights. However, the first paragraph of article 23 specifies that these benefits
are potential sources for legislation regarding data protection and that no such legislation
should interfere, unduly, with any other fundamental right, including the right to data
protection. Id.
107. Id. art. 24.

2019]

DAT A PR O TE CTI O N

311

capability to create a data processing infrastructure (and the benefit they may receive
from such processing) and the risk of harms resulting from such processing. 108 The
GDPR also contains provisions that allow individual Member States and industry
associations to set their own codes of conduct with regard to data processing, 109
further allowing for more specific refinement of this harm/benefit system as it applies
to different countries or industries.
The final element of the data protection framework, requirements for transparency
and redress, is where the GDPR truly excels. A key requirement throughout the
provisions of the GDPR is the need for transparency in data processing. 110 Contained
within this transparency requirement are three other requirements: first, a right of
proper notice;111 second, a right of access by the data subject;112 and third, a right of
rectification by the data subject.113
Unlike the 1995 Directive, which required only that a data processor provide
information regarding the identity of the processing and the purposes of
processing,114 the GDPR requires “clear and plain language,”115 which provides
proper notice to the data subject regarding contact details of the processor, identity
of the data protection officer, the purposes of processing, the interest which justifies
the processing, recipients of the personal data, the categories of data to be processed,
and information regarding the data subject’s rights with respect to their personal
data.116 Such information relates back to the consent requirement discussed earlier,
and helps to reduce the “knowledge gap” between data subject and data processor 117
and therefore allows for properly informed consent by the data subject. 118
In addition to requiring notice be given to the data subject, proper transparency
requires that a data subject be allowed to access personal data held by the
processor.119 This is important because there are methods by which a processor can
obtain and process personal data without getting consent of the data subject,120
meaning the data subject may not have been aware, at first, that the data was collected
or processed. This right allows for interested data subjects to discover who (and how)
their data is being processed.121

108. Alo, supra note 90, at 1134–37 (discussing the deterring effects of data protection
laws (namely the 1995 Directive) that do not take into account the size and ability of the data
processors).
109. GDPR, supra note 62, art. 41, ¶ 1.
110. Id. arts. 5, 12, 26, 40.
111. Id. art. 12.
112. Id. art. 15.
113. Id. art. 16.
114. The 1995 Directive, supra note 51, art. 10.
115. GDPR, supra note 62, art. 12.
116. Id. art. 13.
117. Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1683.
118. GDPR, supra note 62, art. 4.
119. Id. art. 15.
120. Id. art. 6.
121. Francoise Gilbert, European Data Protection 2.0: New Compliance Requirements in
Sight—What the Proposed EU Data Protection Regulation Means for U.S. Companies, 28
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 815, 843–45 (2012).
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The right of access, under the GDPR, is not automatic. It must be exercised by the
data subjects themselves rather than automatically provided by a data processor to
every data subject.122 This helps to offset any deterrent effects against smaller
enterprises that would be present by requiring data processors to actively inform all
data subjects that their data is being processed123 because enterprises are only
required to provide information to data subjects who request that information. 124
Closely linked to the previous two rights is the right of rectification: the ability to
correct incorrect or inaccurate information regarding a data subject. 125 Within the
transparency requirement, this requirement is vital since it allows a data subject to
demand the correction of information that they find to be incorrect. Although other
alternatives to a right of rectification have been proposed, 126 these solutions
ultimately fail to offer the simplicity and effectiveness that a right to rectification
provides.
Even with these rights in place, a data protection regime is not complete without
offering a means of redress; regulations which are not enforced by appropriate
agencies are essentially useless. In this respect, the GDPR offers several advantages
over the previous 1995 Directive. First, the GDPR specifically allows for class action
remedies,127 which are vital for enforcing rights where “no single individual would
find it worthwhile to pursue a lawsuit independently,”128 making class actions a
“powerful regulatory enforcement tool.”129 Without the ability for individuals to act
collectively, it would be difficult for a single data subject to bring suit, either through
the courts or through administrative proceedings, against a large data processor.
The GDPR also establishes two new, independent agencies responsible for
maintaining and enforcing the GDPR and its corresponding rights. The first,
Supervisory Authorities, are established by individual Member States, for the
purposes of enforcing the GDPR.130 Importantly, Supervisory Authorities are
completely independent entities “competent for the performance of the tasks
assigned” to them.131 The powers of each Supervisory Authorities include the ability

122. GDPR, supra note 62, art. 15. This article states that data subjects have “the right to
obtain,” not that data processors need to automatically provide, various pieces of information.
Id.
123. Alo, supra note 90, at 1135.
124. GDPR, supra note 62, art. 15; see also Alex Hickey, 6 Months to GDPR: What’s
Next?, CIO DIVE (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.ciodive.com/news/6-months-to-gdpr-whats
-next/511761/ [https://perma.cc/PP2A-WWTJ].
125. GDPR, supra note 62, art. 16; see also Bignami, supra note 23, at 814 (discussing
some of the harms that can result from incorrect personal data being used for data processing).
126. See, e.g., LoCascio, supra note 59, at 326–27 (comparing a right to rectification with
a right of the data subjects to merely add their own information, rather than removing
“incorrect” information).
127. GDPR, supra note 62, art. 80 (allowing individuals to identify “a not-for-profit body,
organisation or association . . . to lodge the complaint on his or her behalf”).
128. Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action
and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 182 (2001).
129. Id. at 183.
130. GDPR, supra note 62, arts. 51, 58.
131. Id. art. 55.
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to carry out appropriate investigations, impose injunctions as necessary, and levy
fines on non-compliant enterprises.132
Beyond this, the GDPR provides for a new administrative agency capable of
enforcing its provisions—a European Data Protection Board (EDPB).133 The EDPB
has a myriad of responsibilities, including monitoring application of the GDPR,
advising the European Commission regarding data protection laws, and issuing
guidelines for data processors to follow. 134 In fact, the EDPB has already begun the
arduous process of analyzing implementation of the GDPR and providing guidelines
in order to help entities comply with its provisions. 135 The EDPB will also be an
independent entity, composed entirely of members from the individual Supervisory
Authorities of each Member State.136 Independence of these authorities is important
since, in addition to monitoring the behavior of private enterprises, the GDPR also
applies to processing done by state actors.
Overall, the GDPR does fit well with the three-element framework developed
earlier in this Note. Although it does continue to focus on the consent of the
individual data subject as justification for various data processing, 137 the GDPR
provides a good baseline of data protection for Member States of the European
Union.138 It enumerates possible harms and benefits, gives Member States the ability
to balance them as they see fit, and gives some guidance to enterprises on how to
balance the two.139 Finally, by ensuring both the data processing is a transparent
process and that there are appropriate measures for redress present for data subjects
to pursue if needed, the GDPR imposes very strong protections for the fundamental
rights of citizens of the European Union.140

132. Id. art. 58.
133. Id. art. 68. The EDPB actually replaced the Data Protection Working Party established
under Article 29 of the 1995 Directive, but under the GDPR the EDPB has much more
authority than the Data Protection Working Party possessed. Cynthia O’Donoghue &
Alexander Mackay, European Data Protection Board Replaces Article 29 Working Party,
REEDSMITH: TECH. LAW DISPATCH (July 2, 2018), https://www.technologylawdispatch.com
/2018/07/privacy-data-protection/european-data-protection-board-replaces-article-29
-working-party/ [https://perma.cc/J5G7-QE9M].
134. GDPR, supra note 62, art. 70.
135. General
Guidance,
EDPB
https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/general
-guidance_en; see also European Data Protection Board Backs Ban on ‘Cookie Walls’, OUTLAW (May 31, 2018), https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2018/may/european-data
-protection-board-cookie-walls-ban/ [https://perma.cc/BG26-5BX3].
136. See GDPR, supra note 62, art. 69.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 92–98. In fact, the GDPR as a whole focuses on
individual rights more so than duties of businesses. See INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, PREPARING
FOR THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR): 12 STEPS TO TAKE NOW 4 (2017)
(listing a number of individual rights guaranteed by the GDPR, including rights to (1) be
informed, (2) access, (3) rectification, (4) erasure, (5) restrict processing, (6) data portability,
(7) object, and (8) not to be subject to automated decision-making).
138. A baseline which has enabled and required individual Member States to implement
their own data protection laws. See supra text accompanying notes 99–106.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 107–109.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 126–132.
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In addition, since it came into effect, the European Union has shown a renewed
commitment to enforcing the GDPR and data protection more generally—a heavy
criticism that plagued the 1995 Directive.141 Max Schrems142 has already brought a
number of cases against prominent companies, like Facebook and Google, over
alleged violations of the GDPR.143 In addition, the European Parliament has
demonstrated that it may no longer be willing to concede to the United States’ lax
data protection laws when it decided that it may revoke the Privacy Shield framework
at some point in the future144 if the United States does not become fully compliant
by September 1, 2018.145 The actions suggest that, with the passage of the GDPR,
the European Union will be much more proactive and effective in protecting the
personal data of its citizens than it has been in the past. 146 In fact, with its
development of the ePrivacy Regulation, the European Union is already looking
towards the future of data protection in the digital world. 147 While this regulation, if

141. See THORBEN BURGHARDT, KLEMENS BÖHM, ERIK BUCHMANN, JÜRGEN KÜHLING &
ANASTASIOS SIVRIDIS, A STUDY ON THE LACK OF ENFORCEMENT OF DATA PROTECTION ACTS
(2009).
142. Famous for his cases that invalidated the former “Safe Harbor” data regime between
the United States and the European Union. See, e.g., Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot.
Comm’r (2015).
143. NOYB, GDPR: NOYB.EU FILED FOUR COMPLAINTS OVER “FORCED CONSENT “ AGAINST
GOOGLE, INSTAGRAM, WHATSAPP AND FACEBOOK (2018); Derek Scally, Max Schrems Files
First Cases Under GDPR Against Facebook and Google, IRISH TIMES (May 25, 2018, 8:03
AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/max-schrems-files-first-cases-under
-gdpr-against-facebook-and-google-1.3508177 [https://perma.cc/EX3F-U95B].
144. This framework, which replaced the former EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Regime, allows for
the transfer of information and personal data (for commercial purposes) between the European
Union and United States. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF
THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK.
145. Resolution on the Adequacy of the Protection Afforded by the EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield, EUR. PARL. DOC. B8-0305 (2018); see also Matthew J. Majkut, Paul Hastings LLP,
European Parliament Votes to Suspend EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, LEXOLOGY (July 5, 2018),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=60cb18f1-c657-44e0-a030-f83eec6d5211
[https://perma.cc/6TPK-HMKQ]. Despite this threat, though, the deadline passed without
significant correction by the United States. Thus far, the European Union has not followed
through on their threat and the Privacy Shield appears to still be in place. See, e.g., Ariel
Silverstone, John Wunderlich, Sholem Prasow & Stephan Grynwajc, European Parliament
Voted to Suspend Privacy Shield: Now What?, IAPP (Sept. 25, 2018),
https://iapp.org/news/a/european-parliament-voted-to-suspend-privacy-shield-now-what/ .
146. See Natasha Lomas, Europe’s Top Court Takes a Broad View of Privacy
Responsibilities Around Platforms, TECHCRUNCH (June 5, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018
/06/05/europes-top-court-takes-a-broad-view-on-privacy-responsibilities-around-platforms/
[https://perma.cc/56XR-AMPV].
147. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning
the Respect for Private Life and the Protection of Personal Data in Electronic Communications
and Repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic
Communications), COM (2017) 10 final (Oct. 1, 2017).
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it ever passes,148 will come with its own challenges,149 it certainly indicates that the
European Union does not intend the GDPR to be a “one and done” solution to the
problem of data protection.
B. China—The Network Security Law
Although the Chinese government has monitored internet usage for many years,150
it has not taken a particularly active role in the development of a national data
protection regime until relatively recent times.151 It has not been until recently that
China has begun to truly analyze its own role in cyberspace, seeing both the
advantages a proper data protection regime as well as recognizing its potential risks
not only to individuals but to the stability and longevity of the government itself. 152
A cybersecurity framework has been in place since 1994 in order to protect
“critical national infrastructures,”153 but this framework provides “[l]ittle detail”
apart from stipulating multiple levels of security needs and allowing for further
development by “relevant departments.”154 In 2003, the government revisited its
cybersecurity regime, promulgating Document 27, in an attempt to unify regional
cybersecurity regimes.155 Ultimately, though, Document 27 (even the new 2012
version) has been seen as having the opposite effect, resulting in various interagency
disputes that prevent uniformity throughout the nation, caused by the opinion’s “grab

148. See Andrew Ross, European ePrivacy Regulation: Work in Progress, INFO. AGE
(June 7, 2018), https://www.information-age.com/european-eprivacy-regulation-123472251/
[https://perma.cc/W9CQ-S5ND].
149. See, e.g., Natasha Singer, The Next Privacy Battle in Europe Is over This New Law,
N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/27/technology/europe
-eprivacy-regulation-battle.html [https://perma.cc/Q3RB-TUGH].
150. CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFO. CTR., STATISTICAL REPORT ON INTERNET
DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA (2017) (the latest of thirty-nine reports which document the
development of China’s internet usage since 1997).
151. Guowuyuan Guanyu Dali Tuijun Xinxi Hua Fazhan He Qieshi Baozhang Xinxi
Anquan De Ruogan Yijian (国务院关于大力推进信息化发展和切实保障信息安全的若干
意见) [Certain Opinions of the State Council on Promoting Informatization Development and
Practically Safeguarding Information Security] (promulgated by the St. Council, June 28,
2012, effective June 28, 2012) Guo Fa [2012] No. 23 (WestlawChina) [hereinafter
Informatization Opinions].
152. See AMY CHANG, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., WARRING STATE: CHINA’S
CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY 10 (2014); see also, Edward Wong, For China, Cybersecurity Is
Part of Strategy for Protecting the Communist Party, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014, 10:00 AM),
https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/for-china-cybersecurity-is-part-of-strategy
-for-protecting-the-communist-party/ [https://perma.cc/ZE5C-DWLJ].
153. Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, Beyond the New “Digital Divide”:
Analyzing the Evolving Role of National Governments in Internet Governance and Enhancing
Cybersecurity, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 119, 158 (2014).
154. Id.
155. Guojia Xinxihua Lingdao Xiaozu Guanyu Jiaqiang Xinxi Anquan Baozchang
Gongzuo De Jijian (国家 信息化领导小组关于加强信息安全保障工作的 意见) [Document
27: Opinions for Strengthening Information Security Assurance Work] (promulgated by the
St. Council, Sept. 9, 2003, effective Sept. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Document 27].
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bag of vague policy proposals” and its failure to be “internally consistent.” 156 In fact,
most scholarship regarding China’s cyberspace regimes has been focused on its
cybersecurity regimes, and how such regimes pose a threat (either militarily or
economically) to other regions, and not on how China has developed its own
domestic data protection regimes.157
Unlike data protection in the European Union, which at its base recognizes the
right to data protection as a fundamental right, data protection in China is arguably
in place primarily to protect the governing power of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP).158 Beginning with the proposition that order and stability (in the form of a
stable government) override the interests of an individual, 159 Chinese cybersecurity
policy has evolved over time to encompass both the CCP’s desire for economic
growth (on the international stage) as well as its desire to maintain domestic stability
(on the national stage).160 For years, it has been the Chinese government’s position
that personal information security is important for “[p]roperly guiding internet
opinion,”161 and the government has used this interest in social stability—which it
considers paramount during this “crucial stage of reform and development”—as a
pretense for monitoring, controlling, and even protecting personal data. 162
The true buildup to China’s current Network Security Law 163 began in 2012,
shortly before Xi Jinping ascended to power in the Communist Party. 164 In July, the

156. Adam Segal, China Moves Forward on Cybersecurity Policy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELS. (July 24, 2012), https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-moves-forward-cybersecurity-policy
[https://perma.cc/9AF3-LYW5]; see also Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell & Andreas
Kuehn, Unpacking the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the
Public and Private Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 32–33 (2016).
157. See generally China’s Technological Rise: Challenges to U.S. Innovation and
Security: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific of the H. Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 115th Cong. 3–4 (2017) (statement of Rep. Ted Yoho, Chairman, Subcomm. on Asia
and the Pacific); JASON R. FRITZ, CHINA’S CYBER WARFARE: THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC
DOCTRINE (2017); SCOTT WARREN HAROLD, MARTIN C. LIBICKI & ASTRID STUTH CEVALLOS,
GETTING TO YES WITH CHINA IN CYBERSPACE (2016).
158. CHANG, supra note 152; see also, Wong, supra note 152.
159. See HAROLD ET AL., supra note 157, at 22.
160. CHANG, supra note 152, at 7.
161. Chris Buckley & Lucy Hornby, China Defends Censorship After Google Threat,
REUTERS (Jan. 14, 2010, 12:24 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usagoogle/china-defends-censorship-after-google-threat-idUSTRE60C1TR20100114 [https://
perma.cc/XRK5-QNGW].
162. Id.; see generally INTERNET CENSORSHIP (Margaret Haerens & Lynn M. Zott eds.,
2014).
163. Wangluo anquan fa (网络安全法) [Network Security Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2016-11/07/content_2001605.htm
[https://perma.cc
/XR8H-STPP]. Some sources refer to this law, alternatively, as the Cybersecurity Law due to
the practical purposes of the law, but the more literal translation is Network Security Law. In
order to be as true as possible to the source material, this Note will use the latter, more literal
translation, although other cited sources may refer to it by its alternative name.
164. See China New Leaders: Xi Jinping Heads Line-Up for Politburo, BBC (Nov. 15,
2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20322288 [https://perma.cc/H2GM
-AYXY]; The Power of Xi Jinping, ECONOMIST (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.economist.com
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State Council promulgated an opinion calling for all regions and agencies to begin
implementing strategies designed to increase internet access across the country and
for those same entities to institute effective information security systems. 165
Additionally in 2012, the Standardization Administration of the People’s Republic
of China set forth nonmandatory guidelines related to the protection of personal
information.166 These guidelines included fundamental principles that should be
followed,167 as well as a broad overview of the different steps involved in the
processing of personal data.168
In 2014, President Xi established the Central Network Security and Information
Leading Small Group (“Network LSG”), identifying “Internet security and
informatization [as] a major strategic issue,” while at the same time reaffirming that
Chinese data protection strategies envision an internet intended to “nurture
socialism’s core values.”169 Overall, the trend in China has been a domestic focus on
improving and preserving native internet use170 rather than following other
globalized trends.171 This trend towards domestic control and ownership of data

/news/china/21618882-cult-personality-growing-around-chinas-president-what-will-he-do
-his-political [https://perma.cc/V5ZY-NQ26].
165. Informatization Opinions, supra note 151.
166. Xinxi Anquan Jishu Gonggong Ji Shangyong Fuwu Xinxi Xitong Geren Xinxi Baohu
Zhinan (信息安全技术 公共及商用服务信息系统个人信息保护指南) [Information
Security Technology: Guidelines on Personal Information Protection of Public and
Commercial Service Information Systems] (promulgated by the General Administration of
Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine & the Standardization Administration of the
People’s Republic of China, Nov. 5, 2012, effective Feb. 1, 2013) GB/Z 28828-2012
(WestlawChina).
167. Id. art. 4.2. These principles include the principles of clear purposes, personal consent,
security guarantee, and clear responsibility. Id.
168. Id. art. 5. These stages are the collection stage, id. art. 5.2, the processing stage, id.
art. 5.3, the transfer stage, id. art. 5.4, and the deletion stage, id. art. 5.5.
169. Shannon Tiezzi, Xi Jinping Leads China’s New Internet Security Group, DIPLOMAT
(Feb. 28, 2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/02/xi-jinping-leads-chinas-new-internet
-security-group/ [https://perma.cc/KT85-L8FX]; see also Xijinping: ba woguo cong wangluo
daguo jianshechengwei wangluo qiangguo (习近平:把我国从网络大国建设成为网络强国)
[Xi Jinping: Building China into a Powerful Network Power from a Large Network Power],
XINHUANET
(Feb.
27,
2014),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-02/27/c
_119538788.htm [https://perma.cc/ZC8N-XDJH].
170. See Shackelford & Craig, supra note 153, at 162–63 (arguing that the large breadth
of regulations is a result of China’s “push for ‘indigenous innovation’”); see also DIETER
ERNST, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION AND GLOBALIZATION: THE CHALLENGE FOR CHINA’S
STANDARDIZATION STRATEGY 36 (2011) (describing requirements for Chinese critical
information infrastructures to be based on the Chinese mainland rather than outsourced to
globalized industry leaders).
171. See Scott Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions: Explaining
China’s Involvement in High-Tech Standards Wars, 2 ASIA POL’Y 41, 57–59 (2006) (detailing
industry initiatives within China that sought to develop their own home networking standards,
as opposed to joining standards set by the international community); Jun Mai, Xi Jinping
Renews ‘Cyber Sovereignty’ Call at China’s Top Meeting of Internet Minds, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Dec. 3, 2017, 11:20 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies
-politics/article/2122683/xi-jinping-renews-cyber-sovereignty-call-chinas-top [https://perma

318

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:297

processing infrastructure has continued into the modern day, with the passing, in
2016, of the Network Security Law, which came into effect on June 1, 2017. 172
1. The Network Security Law
While the Network Security Law does represent a very positive step for data
protection in China, it is still far from perfect. Like other laws within China, the
Network Security Law suffers from a problem with vagueness.173 At times, it fails to
elaborate specific remedies and instead merely references “administrative
regulations” that should come in the future, but which were not present at the time
the law came into effect.174 Although prior to implementation, there were several
administrative measures that the Network Security Law could potentially refer to, 175
unfortunately the Network Security Law does not explicitly reference these laws.
Like the GDPR, this Note will first consider the data stewardship element with
regard to the Network Security Law. While consent is required under the Network
Security Law, it is far from the primary focus of the law. In fact, the word consent
(同意) only appears three times in the entire Network Security Law 176 and is not

.cc/ZBC2-D6VA] (reaffirming President Xi’s support for cyber sovereignty). But see Cate
Cadell, China’s Xi Says Country Will Not Close Door to Global Internet, REUTERS (Dec. 2,
2017, 9:54 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-cyber/chinas-xi-says-country-will
-not-close-door-to-global-internet-idUSKBN1DX01S
[https://perma.cc/YN98-2VB7]
(quoting note by Xi claiming that China’s doors will only become “more and more open”).
172. Network Security Law, supra note 163, art. 79; see also China’s New Cybersecurity
Law Takes Effect Today, and Many Are Confused, CNBC (June 1, 2017, 3:15 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/31/chinas-new-cybersecurity-law-takes-effect-today.html
[https://perma.cc/96VR-25PF].
173. See, e.g., Nicole Chaput, An Introduction to Insurance Law and Coverage in the
People’s Republic of China, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 871, 891 (1995) (discussing the shortcomings
involved with China’s vague contract laws); Lawrence J. Trautman, American Entrepreneur
in China: Potholes and Roadblocks on the Silk Road to Prosperity, 12 WAKE FOREST J. BUS.
& INTELL. PROP. L. 425, 436 (2012) (highlighting the shortcomings of vague investment laws
in China).
174. Kareena Teh & Philip Kwok, Dechert LLP, The Cyberspace Administration of China
Clarifies the Cybersecurity Law, LEXOLOGY (June 2, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=2c6842f5-7c4a-49de-8498-da93e1a90a81 [https://perma.cc/D6AA-SQWJ].
175. See, e.g., Tongxin Wangluo Anquan Fanghu Guanli Banfa (通信网络安全防护管理
办法) [Administrative Measures for the Security Protection of Communication Networks]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Indus. & Info. Tech., Jan. 21, 2010, effective Mar. 3, 2010)
(WestlawChina); Xinxi Anquan Dengji Baohu Guanli Banfa (信息安全等级保护管理办法)
[Administrative Measures for Hierarchical Protection of Information Security] (promulgated
by the Ministry of Pub. Sec., June 26, 2007, effective June 26, 2007) Gong Tong Zi No. 43
(WestlawChina). But see Wangluo Chanpin He Fuwu Anquan Shencha Banfa (Shixing) (网
络产品和服务安全审查办法 (试行)) [Measures for Security Review of Network Products
and Services (For Trial Implementation)] (promulgated by the St. Internet Info. Office, May
2, 2017, effective June 1, 2017) [hereinafter Security Review Measures] (a short law that sets
out guidelines for security review of networks, that was passed along with the Network
Security Law).
176. Network Security Law, supra note 163, arts. 22, 41, 42.
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actually defined within the text of the law itself. Rather, the law focuses far more on
requiring proper use of personal data than acquiring consent of the data subject.177
Before listing permissible ways in which to use personal data, the Network
Security Law, in article 27, first proscribes certain behaviors with respect to network
security and personal data. These behaviors include the theft of network data,
enabling others to endanger network services, and disturbing the use of network data
by others.178 When the Network Security Law describes permissible use of personal
data, though, it again runs into problems of vagueness. While the law does require
“dueness and necessity,” it does not define possible justifications for processing of
personal data or what qualifies as a valid necessity. 179
Despite these weaknesses with regard to consent and proper data uses, the
Network Security Law does maintain a strict focus on ensuring that data processors
properly care for the personal data in their possession. Beyond simply creating a
requirement for data processors themselves to monitor and protect personal data, 180
the Network Security Law lists specific measures that can be put into place to ensure
proper protection of personal data, including encryption, security training, and proper
documentation of security measures in place. 181 The law also creates a mandate for
appropriate government agencies to review security measures in place for protection
of personal data in order to ensure that they provide adequate protection. 182
Although the Network Security Law does an excellent job providing for proper
data stewardship, it fails to establish any system by which a data processor can
balance the harms and benefits of data processing. Other than vague references to
“social ethics” or potential “harm” resulting from improper data processing, 183 there
are no specific references to harms that could result from improper data
processing.184 Similarly, beyond the vague references to “dueness and necessity”
mentioned earlier, there are no specific benefits to data processing that are recognized
in the law itself.
Without such a system in place, data processors are given almost no notice as to
what will or will not constitute valid data processing. 185 There are several possible

177. Id. at 41 (describing circumstances in which collection and use of personal data is
permissible without explicitly stating consent as a justification).
178. Id. art. 27.
179. Id. art. 41.
180. Id. arts. 10, 36, 40.
181. Id. arts. 21, 34; see also LING HUANG, DANIEL ILAN, ZHENG (JONATHAN) ZHOU &
KATHERINE MOONEY CARROLL, UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF CHINA’S FAR-REACHING
NEW CYBERSECURITY LAW (2018).
182. Network Security Law, supra note 163, art. 51; see also Security Review Measures,
supra note 175.
183. See, e.g., Network Security Law, supra note 163, arts. 9, 12, 54. 64.
184. In a rather circular bit of reasoning, it seems that the only way to cause harm would
be by violating the law, while at the same time, the law is only violated when harm is caused.
See id. art. 64.
185. Additionally, since China is a civil law system, courts are free to look at each case
independently, meaning that enterprises cannot rely on prior case law to (always) shape their
behavior, though trends in prior cases may help provide some guidance where the law is silent.
See Zhang Jing, Five-Year Review of China’s Case Guidance System, 2016 Zeitschrift für
Chinesisches Recht [ZChinR] 20 (2016).
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explanations for such silence. First, it could simply be that the National People’s
Congress contemplated later regulations and guidelines to supplement the Network
Security Law186 and so left the law itself relatively vague (and broad).187 An
alternative reason for the silence could be that creating a very broad law helps to
further the government’s goal of controlling internet content188—a goal that seems
increasingly likely given the Chinese government’s actions recently. 189 Regardless
of the reasoning behind the language of this law, one thing is still very clear—little
guidance is given to data processors regarding what harms they must avoid and what
benefits they should seek.190
The Network Security Law also takes a very different approach to transparency
and redress than the GDPR. As discussed earlier, 191 three general rights make up
sufficient transparency with regard to data processing: a right of notice, a right of
access, and a right of rectification. With regard to the right of notice, the Network
Security Law does require that data processors publicize the rules for collection and
use of personal data.192 However, the details of these rules are not clearly enumerated,
as they are in the GDPR,193 again leaving processors with uncertainty regarding their
desires.194
Absent entirely from the Network Security Law is the right of access. There is no
express right for an individual to request information or data from a data processor.
Although the Network Security Law does contain a right of rectification, 195 allowing
for individuals to force data processors to correct or delete erroneous data, such a

186. Most such guidance only exists in draft form, though, and has thus not been enacted
by the Chinese government. See Ulrike Glueck & Sammie Hu, New Developments in the PRC
Cyber Security Law, LEXOLOGY (Dec., 21, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=c56075af-1e68-4e4e-96da-b1982c6cf948 [https://perma.cc/C47V-VMRW].
187. See HUANG ET AL., supra note 181, at 15. But see supra note 175 and accompanying
text.
188. See Buckley & Hornby, supra note 161; see also Shackelford & Craig, supra note153,
at 31.
189. See Rhys Dipshan, China’s Cybersecurity Law Isn’t Just About Cybersecurity,
LAW.COM: LEGALTECH NEWS (Jan. 29, 2018, 1:13 PM), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews
/sites/legaltechnews/2018/01/29/chinas-cybersecurity-law-isnt-just-about-cybersecurity/
[https://perma.cc/4CZQ-CES8].
190. UN Rights Chief Concerned By ‘Broad Scope’ of China’s New Security Law, UN
NEWS (July 7, 2015), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51355#.WkkP8BM
-eu6 [https://perma.cc/3XYB-G33D] [hereinafter UN Rights Chief Concerns].
191. See supra notes 111–126 and accompanying text.
192. Network Security Law, supra note 163, art. 41.
193. See GDPR, supra note 62, art. 13.
194. Such uncertainty in legislative goals seems to be a theme throughout much of the
Chinese government’s behavior regarding cybersecurity (of which data protection is just one
facet). See HAROLD ET AL., supra note 157, at 60–61; see generally FRITZ, supra note 157.
Again, there could be a number of possible reasons for this. One of the primary reasons seems
to be the presence of differing goals between various governmental agencies, each with
seemingly equal authority, but at the same time, very divergent ideas of how to implement
those ideas. See CHANG, supra note 152, at 15–20.
195. Network Security Law, supra note 163, art. 43 (allowing for data subject to request
rectification if they discover something inaccurate).
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right is weakened significantly by the lack of a corresponding right to discover that
information.196
Rather than focusing on transparency, which would better allow for individuals
to enforce the provisions of the law, the Network Security Law attempts to shift the
burden of enforcing its provisions almost entirely onto its built-in (and state
controlled) measures for redress. 197 Unlike many of its other provisions, the articles
providing for fines, injunctions, and other remedies contain significant detail,
spelling out both the offense as well as corresponding punishment.198 In addition, the
Network Security Law gives authority to monitor and enforce these provisions to
“the National Grid and Information Department.”199 This department is the
Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), which reports to the Network LSG,
which in turn is led by President Xi Jinping.200 Unlike the Supervisory Authorities
under the GDPR, the CAC is a subservient government agency and does not exercise
its own independent judgment, again showing the Chinese government’s desire to
maintain control over internet content.201
Overall, the biggest criticism with China’s Network Security Law is the
vagueness of many of its provisions. 202 Without adequately clear guidelines, data
processors are left without any clear way of knowing whether or not their behavior
complies with the law. As a result, large enterprises may be tempted to reduce (or
even abandon altogether) their operations within mainland China. 203 In time, further

196. See generally Samson Yoseph Esayas, Breach Notification Requirements Under the
European Union Legal Framework: Convergence, Conflicts, and Complexity in Compliance,
31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 317 (2014); Brandon Faulkner, Hacking into
Data Breach Notification Laws, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1097 (2007); Aidan Forde, Implications of
the Right to Be Forgotten, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 83 (2015); Jacqueline May Tom,
A Simple Compromise: The Need for a Federal Data Breach Notification Law, 84 SAINT
JOHN’S L. REV. 1569 (2010); Wehbé, supra note 56, at 90–93.
197. Network Security Law, supra note 163, arts. 59–75.
198. Id.
199. Id. art. 51.
200. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
201. See Shackelford & Craig, supra note153, at 30–32; see also Ariel E. Wade, Note, A
New Age of Privacy Protection: A Proposal for an International Personal Data Privacy
Treaty, 42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 659, 666–67 (2010). Fears that this the Network Security
Law could be used to stifle dissent and support began shortly after implementations, when the
government began investigating large social media platforms throughout the country. See Josh
Chin, China Targets Social-Media Giants WeChat, Weibo in Cybersecurity Probe, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 11, 2017, 2:14 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wechat-weibo-among-targets-in
-china-cybersecurity-probe-1502432081?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/9RZC-USXH].
202. Jack Wagner, China’s Cybersecurity Law: What You Need to Know, DIPLOMAT (June
1, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/chinas-cybersecurity-law-what-you-need-to-know/
[https://perma.cc/WL7H-PKNA]; see also Carly Ramsey & Ben Wootliff, China’s Cyber
Security Law: The Impossibility of Compliance?, FORBES: RISKMAP (May 29, 2017, 3:29
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2017/05/29/chinas-cyber-security-law-the
-impossibility-of-compliance/#73f85ae8471c [https://perma.cc/PP4G-HHWD].
203. See LYNSKEY, supra note 6, at 76–81; Nicolas Groffman, Foreign Firms Watch Out,
Beijing May Require You to Leave China Data in China, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 29,
2017), https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2117346/foreign-firms-watch-out
-beijing-may-require-you-leave-china-data [https://perma.cc/7NEN-874L]. He Huifeng,
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guidance may come in the form of administrative regulations and other guidelines, 204
but in the meantime, the government expects full compliance with the law, which
forces some firms to conform to the best of their ability and hope for few negative
consequences.205
C. The United States—NIST
Unlike China and the European Union, the United States has not yet implemented
an omnibus data protection regime,206 in which the laws guarantee a minimum level
of protection.207 Instead, the United States has implemented sector specific data

Cybersecurity Law Causing ‘Mass Concerns’ Among Foreign Firms in China, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Mar. 2, 2018, 6:29 AM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy
/article/2135338/cybersecurity-law-causing-mass-concerns-among-foreign-firms-china
[perma.cc/UY6D-K3JD].
204. The PRC continues to develop its Network Security Law through various regulations,
but the effectiveness and clarity of even these regulations is up for debate. See COVINGTON,
CHINA SEEKS PUBLIC COMMENTS FOR DRAFT REGULATIONS ON CYBERSECURITY MULTI-LEVEL
PROTECTION SCHEME TO IMPLEMENT THE CYBERSECURITY LAW (2018), https://www.cov.com//media/files/corporate/publications/2018/07/china-seeks-public-comments-for-draft
-regulations-on-cybersecurity-multilevel-protection-scheme-to-implement-the-cybersecurity
-law.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWM2-4S6X]. Certain aspects of the Network Security Law
already have draft measures circulating, but when (and if) these measures will be implemented
is still uncertain. See Clarice Yue, Michelle Chan, Sven-Michael Werner & John Shi, China
Cybersecurity Law Update: Draft Guidelines on Security Assessment for Data Export
Revised!, BIRD & BIRD (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2017
/china/draft-guidelines-on-security-assessment-for-data-export-revised
[https://perma.cc
/GQ2M-TJXF] (observing one revised draft of the Guidelines on Security Assessment for Data
Export).
205. See Wagner, supra note 202; see also Nick Beckett, A Guide for Businesses to China’s
First Cyber Security Law, COMPUTERWEEKLY (Nov. 2017), http://www.computerweekly.com
/opinion/Chinas-first-cyber-security-law-what-it-means-for-companies
[https://perma.cc
/EZ4R-MPGQ]; Ron Cheng, China Enforces First Action Under Developing Cyber Security
Law, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/roncheng/2017
/08/08/china-enforces-first-action-under-developing-cyber-security-law/#7d07d0e522bc
[https://perma.cc/4ANR-ST7X] (showing that the Chinese government is fully intent on
punishing even minor infractions of the Network Security Law).
206. Much scholarship discussing data protection laws in the United States refers to these
laws as “data privacy” laws. For the purposes of this Note, the two terms, data protection and
data privacy, will be considered interchangeable. However, especially with respect to the
United States, the terms data protection and data privacy are not, necessarily, interchangeable.
See STEPHEN COBB, DATA PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION: US LAW & LEGISLATION 1 (2016);
PETER P. SWIRE & KENESA AHMAD, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROF’LS, FOUNDATIONS OF
INFORMATION PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION (Terry McQuay ed., 2012); DAVID FLAHERTY,
DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY: COMPARATIVE POLICIES 2 (1985) (distinguishing between
data protection and privacy protection in the legal context).
207. This is not to say that specific states have not implemented their own data protection
laws. See, e.g., An Act to Add Title 1.81.5 (Commencing with Section 1798.100) to Part 4 of
Division 3 of the Civil Code, Relating to Privacy, Assembly Bill No. 375 (2018) (to be codified
at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 et seq.; Andy Green, SHIELD Act Will Update New York State’s
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protection regimes, which apply only to specific industries. 208 In addition, individual
states are free to set their own data protection regimes, and some have done so. 209
The first federal legislation in the United States specifically aimed towards data
protection was passed in 1970,210 the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.211 The
FCRA established three important principles that would go on to be present in future
data protection laws.212 First, it established the principle of individual consent,
requiring citizens to consent to specific types of personal data recording. 213 Second,
it established various administrative procedures (overseen by appropriate agencies)
available to individuals who feel their information is incorrect or their rights have
been violated.214 Third, the FCRA enumerated various conditions under which the
collection and use of personal data can be justified.215
This trend of sector-specific legislation continued through the 1970s into the early
twenty-first century216 and includes: the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of
1974,217 the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,218 the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,219 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999.220 One key aspect of all of these laws is the idea that data protection stems
from an individual’s right to privacy. Unlike in the European Union, where data
protection is recognized as a fundamental right, 221 no right to data protection is
present in the U.S. Constitution. Instead, a constitutional right to privacy has
developed through U.S. case law.222 This right of privacy has been applied and

Breach Notification Law, VARONIS (Apr. 14, 2018), https://blog.varonis.com/shield-act-will
-update-new-york-states-breach-notification-law/ [https://perma.cc/P7KP-4B9E].
208. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012 & Supp. II 2015); Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Children’s Internet
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000); see also GETTING THE DEAL
THROUGH, DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY 191–98 (Rosemary P. Jay ed., 2014) (describing
U.S. data privacy laws as a “patchwork quilt”).
209. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 2017).
210. COBB, supra note 206, at 2.
211. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) [hereinafter FCRA].
212. COBB, supra note 206, at 2.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. Such conditions include (but are not limited to): employment purposes, investment
purposes, and other legitimate business needs. FCRA § 1681b.
216. See COBB, supra note 206, at 5–6.
217. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012).
218. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012 & Supp. III 2016).
219. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
220. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act , Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
221. See supra Section I.A.
222. Namely, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a right to
privacy as inherent in the First Amendment. 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (recognizing a
“penumbra” where privacy is protected from government intervention); see also Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy for
individuals within the context of searches and seizures).
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discussed in several specific instances223 but does not provide the same
comprehensive protection that it does in the European Union.
In addition to this “right of privacy,” other explanations for data protection laws
in the United States have ranged from “the promotion of commerce and wealth, to ‘a
healthy distrust for governmental solutions.’” 224 But despite these reasons, the United
States has still not passed comprehensive national data protection legislation. In place
of such legislation, though, the U.S. government has turned to two alternative
methods of enforcement: self-regulation within the private sector225 and reliance on
the Federal Trade Commission (and its broad authority) as the de facto cybersecurity
agency.226
With regard to industry self-regulation, the primary mechanism by which
enterprises tailor their behavior is by abiding by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology’s Cybersecurity Framework. 227 Although not mandatory itself, 228
the NIST Framework is likely to be considered the new “standard for due diligence”
in the event that an enterprise’s practices were ever questioned in litigation or
investigation.229 As such, it would be in most U.S. enterprises’ best interests to
conform with, or at least familiarize themselves with, this framework.
Beyond the NIST Framework, the FTC, with its responsibility to “monitor all
domestic United States commerce,”230 has undertaken to enforce privacy policies by
classifying violations as “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”231 Unlike the NIST Framework, though, the FTC’s policies are seen as

223. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2016); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976).
224. Robert R. Schriver, Note, You Cheated, You Lied: The Safe Harbor Agreement and
Its Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2777, 2779 (2002)
(quoting James M. Assey, Jr. & Demetrios A. Eleftheriou, The EU-U.S. Privacy Safe Harbor:
Smooth Sailing or Troubled Waters?, 9 COMMLAW CONSEPECTUS 145, 150 (2001)).
225. Balaban, supra note 23, at 9–11.
226. See Stuart L. Pardau & Blake Edwards, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and
Privacy by Design: New Legal Frontiers in Cybersecurity, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 227, 235–44
(2017).
227. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (2018) [hereinafter NIST Framework]. A new version,
Version 1.1, was released in April 2018, meaning that many businesses have not had a chance
to fully implement appropriate data protection regulations, but looking at industry compliance
with the previous version, released in 2014, helps to determine the likelihood of compliance
with the current version. See The Stakeholders Have Spoken: NIST to Refine Cybersecurity
Framework, NIST (June 9, 2016), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2016/06
/stakeholders-have-spoken-nist-refine-cybersecurity-framework
[https://perma.cc/44V6
-LDZP].
228. Except to government entities.
229. Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell & Jeffrey Haut, Bottoms Up: A Comparison of
“Voluntary” Cybersecurity Frameworks, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 217, 222 (2016); see also
John Verry, Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn’t Really Voluntary, PIVOTPOINT SEC.
(Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/blog/nist-cybersecurity-framework/
[https://perma.cc/2MBC-CDJS].
230. Balaban, supra note 23, at 14.
231. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) [hereinafter FTCA].
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reactive, rather than proactive, since the FTC cannot act until an enterprise has
wronged the public.232
1. NIST Framework and the FTC
In response to an executive order by President Obama acknowledging a need for
“improved cybersecurity,”233 NIST developed its framework234 as a way to “protect
individual privacy and civil liberties.”235 Because the NIST Framework is a
“voluntary Framework”236 there are no (direct) consequences of enterprises not
following its provisions. Additionally, the focus of the NIST Framework is behavior
of data processors, rather than a focus on data subjects and their rights, which means
that it severely lacks any forms of redress or transparency (as will be discussed later).
To fill in the gaps of the NIST Framework, though, the FTC has stepped into the role
of a national data protection authority within the United States. 237
Even without the presence of an omnibus data protection law, the current data
protection regime has a heavy focus on the data stewardship element of our data
protection framework. The NIST Framework only mentions consent in passing, as
one possible factor for enterprises to consider when implementing their data
protection policies,238 and instead focuses on ensuring the data processors develop
appropriate systems for the use and protection of personal data. 239 The NIST
Framework goes into significant detail regarding specific ways to protect personal
data (even though it doesn’t specify how exactly to use that personal data). 240
Because of its focus on the behavior of data processors generally, rather than the
rights of data subjects, the NIST Framework best fits with the data stewardship
element of our data protection framework. The burden, under the NIST Framework,
is entirely on the data processors to “[d]evelop and implement the appropriate
safeguards” for data processing activities, 241 allowing for data subjects to remain
confident that their personal data will neither be leaked to unknown third-parties nor
used for purposes of which they do not approve.242
Although the NIST Framework describes itself as providing a method of “riskbased” implementation,243 without actually enumerating potential risks, it is justified
in doing so. Since the NIST Framework is intended to help data processors create
their own data protection regimes (rather than simply using the NIST Framework

232. Balaban, supra note 23, at 14.
233. Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013).
234. See generally Shackelford et al., supra note 229, at 221–24.
235. NIST Framework, supra note 227, at 2. The recognition of such rights is very
reminiscent of the European Union’s approach to data protection, which recognizes it as a
fundamental right of all people. See GDPR, supra note 62, pmbl. ¶ 1.
236. NIST Framework, supra note 227, at vi.
237. See Pardau & Edwards, supra note 226, at 229.
238. NIST Framework, supra note 227, at 19.
239. Id. at 7–8.
240. Id. at 23–44.
241. Id. at 46.
242. See Cate, supra note 8, at 12.
243. NIST Framework, supra note 227, at 4.
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themselves)244 it cannot enumerate specific harms because such a list would apply
(or not apply) to different industries in different ways. 245 Instead, the NIST
Framework requires data processors to develop their own risk management system,
which includes the identification of potential harm of processing, the chance of those
harms occurring, and the goals and benefits of that processing.246
A problem with this approach, though, is that it allows individual data processors
to create their own framework without necessarily needing to adopt industry standard
practices.247 Without an overarching organization that can reconcile competing
safety standards within an industry, the NIST Framework leaves open the door to
competing standards248 and causes significant uncertainty for both data subjects, who
may be uncertain which standard is being applied, and other data processors, who
are unsure whether or not their own standard is adequate when compared with others.
Although the NIST Framework does require consideration of “industry best
practices,”249 it does not explain how those best practices should be determined or
applied.250
Finally, since the goal of the NIST Framework is to guide data processor behavior,
there is very little information pertaining to data subject rights. With exactly one
appearance of the word “transparency,” 251 the NIST only mentions the rights of data
subjects as one consideration in a larger data protection regime, 252 with no guarantees
of data subjects being given notice, access, or rectification. Of course, this also means
there are no means of redress considered within the text of the NIST Framework.
Instead, the rights of data subjects are enforced and protected by the FTC. 253 In
order to truly see the interaction between the right of privacy and data protection in
the United States, one need only examine the behavior of the FTC in recent years.
Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 254 the FTC is empowered to prevent
“unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” 255

244. This is similar to the GDPR’s provisions allowing for Member States and industries
to set their own codes of conduct, GDPR, supra note 62, art. 41, ¶ 1, except under the NIST
Framework there is no underlying minimum of data protection guarantees.
245. See Tara Swaminatha, The Rise of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, CSO (May
11, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3271139/data-protection/the-rise
-of-the-nist-cybersecurity-framework.html [https://perma.cc/E9XS-FTX9].
246. NIST Framework, supra note 227, at 7–8.
247. Id. at 3.
248. See generally INTERNET SEC. ALL., THE CYBERSECURITY SOCIAL CONTRACT:
IMPLEMENTING A MARKET-BASED MODEL FOR CYBERSECURITY (Larry Clinton & David Perera
eds., 2016).
249. NIST Framework, supra note 227, at 11.
250. In fact, the NIST Framework actually declares that one of its goals is to determine
industry best practices, leaving one to wonder which comes first: the NIST Framework or
industry best practices. There is also some concern about whether or not NIST is even the
appropriate agency to oversee data protection and cybersecurity regulations. See H.R. REP.
NO. 115-376, at 25–26 (2017).
251. NIST Framework, supra note 227, at 19.
252. Id.
253. Balaban, supra note 23, at 13–16.
254. FTCA, supra note 231.
255. Id. § 45(a)(2).
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which the FTC has used to enforce the privacy policy. 256 Considering the lack of
guidance given by the NIST Framework with regard to informing data subjects, the
FTC’s authority and willingness to act in this area has been of paramount importance.
Using their broad powers, the FTC has issued a number of consent decrees designed
to define “acceptable data security practices”257 In addition, they have brought more
than sixty cases against companies whose practices have “put consumers’ personal
data at unreasonable risk.”258
Taken together, both the NIST Framework and the powers of the FTC are able to
provide at least some basic data protection for citizens of the United States. The NIST
Framework itself truly focuses on proper data stewardship, rather than just data
subject consent, an issue that the GDPR struggled to resolve. However, where the
NIST Framework begins to fail is in defining harms and benefits for data processors.
Using very vague language, it generally leaves data processors to determine their
own systems of risk management and gives them very little guidance. Finally, while
the FTC has undertaken to protect data subjects’ privacy rights through their broad
authority, ultimately, the United States needs a dedicated agency, like both the
European Union and China, in order to ensure that personal data is being properly
protected and data subjects’ rights enforced.
CONCLUSION
Across the globe, governments have begun to realize that data protection is of
vital importance as the internet grows. Different regions have attempted to regulate
the behavior of data processors in different ways. In the European Union, data
protection is seen as a fundamental right, 259 and so the GDPR focuses on protecting
individual data subjects. In contrast, data protection in China is seen as one of many
tools by which the government can protect social stability. 260 Finally, while the right
to privacy has been recognized in the United States, the primary means for data
protection has been self-regulation by data processors guided by the
recommendations of the NIST.261
Each has its own advantages and disadvantages and can learn from the others.
However, there are a few important lessons that the United States should try to learn
from the other two jurisdictions with regard to its data protection regime and
especially with regard to transparency and redress. First, the United States needs a
dedicated data protection agency analogous to the Supervisory Authorities of the
European Union262 and the National Grid and Information Department.263 Although
the complete independence of such a body would ensure that the government doesn’t
exert undue influence over internet content, the United States tends to provide

256. Balaban, supra note 23, at 14.
257. Pardau & Edwards, supra note 226, at 256; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY
& DATA SECURITY: UPDATE: 2016 at 2 (2016) [hereinafter FTC Report 2016].
258. FTC Report 2016, supra note 257, at 4–5.
259. TFEU, supra note 65, art. 16.
260. See Buckley & Hornby, supra note 161.
261. NIST Framework, supra note 227.
262. GDPR, supra note 62, arts. 51, 58.
263. Network Security Law, supra note 163, art. 51.
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government oversight for its various agencies. But as it stands, there is doubt as to
whether NIST can determine adequate guidelines and whether the FTC is the
appropriate agency to enforce data protection rights. 264
In addition, the United States can also learn from China and Europe with regard
to enumerating harms and benefits from data processing. Currently, the NIST
Framework leaves it up to data processors themselves to develop a system of
managing harms and benefits but gives almost no guidance regarding how to do so,
which leaves data processors unsure what will or will not be acceptable.265 As
previously mentioned, data processors must be made aware of potential harms and
benefits that can be achieved by data processors so that they can properly tailor their
behavior to suit the risks.266
But the United States need not change its regime entirely. In fact, both Europe
and China can learn from the United States’ approach to data stewardship. Although
having oversight and regulations for proper collection of information is important, 267
the real burden should be on data processors to properly protect and use personal
data.268 In this way, the NIST Framework excels, placing a great burden on data
processors to “[d]evelop and implement the appropriate safeguards.” 269 Both Europe,
where the law has a strong focus on consent of the data subject, 270 and China, where
the law is vague regarding proper processing, 271 could benefit from implementing
some NIST-style principles.272
Overall, while no single data protection regime adequately fulfills the threeelement framework set out by this article, each tackle the issue in a different way and
can learn from each other. In the future, it is likely that the United States will attempt
to implement a national data protection law, 273 following the global trend. When it

264. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-376, AT 25–26 (2017); cf. U.S. Telecom. Ass’n v. FCC, 855
F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (suggesting that, if confirmed to
the Supreme Court, Judge Brett Kavanaugh would not be in favor of the broad expansive
powers and authority that the FTC has undertaken and would likely attempt to limit the FTC’s
power in the field of cybersecurity, since Congress has not expressly granted it such power).
265. A similar vagueness problem that plagues China’s Network Security Law, although
that law does at least enumerate some harms and benefits. See supra note 174 and
accompanying text.
266. See CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, supra note 45.
267. See Cate, supra note 8, at 15; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28, at 21;
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 21, at 66–67; Balaban, supra note 23, at 8–11;
Bignami, supra note 23 at 820–22; Schwartz, supra 16, at 1679–80.
268. See supra Section I.A.
269. NIST Framework, supra note 227, at 7.
270. See text accompanying notes 91–94.
271. See Ramsey & Wootliff, supra note 202; UN Rights Chief Concern, supra note 190.
272. Particularly the focus on proper data stewardship and uses in which the NIST
Framework excels. See supra text accompanying notes 239–43.
273. In fact, the United States Senate has recently considered more national laws, but one
did not progress very far before falling flat and the other has yet to progress in Congress. Tim
Peterson, WTF Is the CONSENT Act, DIGIDAY (Apr. 17, 2018), https://digiday.com/media
/what-is-the-consent-act/ [https://perma.cc/DH8X-3D9N]; see also Natasha Singer, White
House Proposes Broad Consumer Data Privacy Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/28/business/white-house-proposes-broad-consumer-data
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does so, it should look not only at its own laws but at those of both the European
Union and China so that it can learn from their mistakes and help bring about a more
secure and globalized internet.274

-privacy-bill.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/BBJ5-X35L].
274. See Moshell, supra note 47, at 388–421.

